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Cities and Displacement



Editorial

Cities are at the forefront of responding to forced migration and do so in highly varied ways. Only one third of the world's more than 20 million refugees presently live in camps; the majority settle in urban areas and peri-urban settlements, largely in developing regions in the Global South. An even larger amount of internally displaced people live in cities. Due to a universal trend towards protracted displacement, cities are becoming increasingly important spaces of integration. This is also recognised at the level of global policies. For example, the New Urban Agenda (2016) promulgated at the Habitat III Conference stressed the responsibility of cities to promoting the rights of migrants and refugees, and the UN's Global Compact of Refugees (2018) called for 'out-of-camp' solutions to forced migration.

While the importance of cities and urban areas for people who seek protection, means of livelihood and passage has been highlighted for some time, many questions remain unanswered. This special issue enquires into the degree to which policies at global, national and local level acknowledge the urbanisation of displacement, as well as into the interdependencies between different actors and levels of governance. Moreover, strategies and motivations of local urban stakeholders in a multi-level governance context are of interest. This issue further asks how climate and environmental stress, inter- and intra-state conflict, and digitisation influence people's movement decisions, trajectories, and their experiences in urban arrival areas.

The main focus of this special issue is cities and urbanising areas – including camps – in the Global South. This, however, does not imply that we ignore refugee movements in the Global North. After all, TRIALOG is published in Germany, a country in which the domestic policy discourse of recent years has been heavily shaped by the massive influx of refugees in 2015. Thus, three articles in this issue relate to the German scene.

In the first article of this issue of TRIALOG, **Eva Dick** uses the case of Kalobeyei settlement in the north of Kenya to disentangle how stakeholders of different levels came to embrace local integration as a 'novel' approach to refugee management. From the national and regional governments' perspective, security interests and a rising gap in humanitarian funding were key factors. For the local government it was about promoting economic development.

In contrast to the common alarmist scenarios of millions of refugees that could soon migrate to Europe, **Benjamin Schraven** gives an overview of recent research on the climate-migration nexus that emphasises the complexity of the interplay between ecology and mobility. The conclusion drawn is that climate change is more likely to lead to more internal and intraregional migration and forced displacement in the Global South. Urban areas play an essential role in that regard, both as actors and as hotspots of mobility and climate change.

The third article of this issue juxtaposes three interviews conducted at the local level in different parts of the world. Chairman **Hamidul Hoque Chowdhury** from Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, **Ullrich Sierau**, the former Lord Mayor of the City of Dortmund in Germany, and **Patrick Lokewan Nabwel**, a GIZ expert posted to Kakuma in Northern Kenya, share first-hand experiences in dealing with the integration of large refugee flows within short and longer periods.

Einhard Schmidt-Kallert's reportage recounts the unlikely story of the squatters of the house at Obere Maschstraße 10 in the city centre of Göttingen. What had started as an emergency project to assist and empower refugees gradually took shape as a housing project, though with special features: autonomous, multi-generational and multi-cultural.

Janina Stürmer's article shows that African cities engage in different forms of city diplomacy, among other ways by demanding a seat at migration policy-making tables. The author concludes that African city diplomacy pursues practical, symbolic and jurisgenerative purposes.

The article by **Hasan Sinemillioglu, Furat Kuti** and **Salah Hhadeeda** depicts the situation and perspectives of the *Ēzidi* [Yazidis] in Iraq, most of whom are currently living in refugee camps in the Duhok region in Northern Iraq, following the exodus from the Sinjar region in August 2014. The article is mainly composed of authentic voices from the *Ēzidi* themselves, leaving a rather gloomy outlook towards their future.

Salam Alhaj investigates differences in work and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan between the Zaatari camp and the city of Amman. The author discusses the effect of residing in the camp on labour participation, engagement in formal work and having work permits, and the variations between Zaatari and Amman.

Ayham Dalal and **Philipp Misselwitz's** article draws the attention to the role of shelter and how it is appropriated by refugees in their daily life. The authors compiled and interpreted architectural and ethnographic data from two camps: Zaatari in Jordan, and Tempohomes in Germany. The authors conclude that no matter how well designed the shelters are, they will always be appropriated for the purpose of dwelling.

The article by **M. Suresh Babu** sheds light on the vulnerabilities of migrants, especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic. His study is based on interviews with migrant workers employed in Chennai in Southern India. According to M. Suresh Babu's findings, key challenges all migrant workers are faced with, such as lack of social security and poor access to basic amenities, have been aggravated by the impact of the pandemic.

Point of departure for **Charles Martin-Shields'** article is the transportation disadvantages faced by many refugees. Drawing on fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur, in his article he evaluates the potential of ride sharing for making refugees' daily lives easier.

Kathrin Golda-Pongratz's essay is based on long-term research in self-built neighbourhoods on the urban fringes of the Peruvian capital Lima and describes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population working in the informal sector. The author posits that displacement and uprooting have become a double condition for migrants who had built their homes decades ago but were forced to return to their places of rural origin during the pandemic.

Eva Dick, Einhard Schmidt-Kallert
and Benjamin Schraven as volume editors

Cities and Displacement

Eva Dick, Einhard Schmidt-Kallert and Benjamin Schraven

Table of contents

- 4 Localisation of Global Refugee Policies
The case of Kenya and Kalobeyei
Eva Dick
- 10 The Nexus between Climate Change and Human Mobility
and Its Relevance for Urban Areas
Benjamin Schraven
- 13 *Group Interview*
Local Government and the Integration of Refugees
Experiences from Bangladesh, Kenya and Germany
- 20 OM10 in Göttingen: From Squatting to a Beacon of New Urbanism
Einhard Schmidt-Kallert
- 25 African City Diplomacy – Municipal Purpose and Action in Transnational
Migration Governance
Janina Stürner-Siovit
- 30 The Êzîdî and the Permanent Life in the Refugee Camps
Hasan Sinemillioglu, Salah Khudeda and Furat Kuti
- 38 Work and Education Outcomes of Syrian Refugees in Jordan
Differences between Zaatarî Camp and Amman
Salam Alhaj Hasan
- 44 Appropriating Shelter
Comparative Views from Germany and Jordan
Ayham Dalal and Philipp Misselwitz
- 52 Vulnerable Livelihoods in Cities during the Pandemic
Migrant Workers in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India
M. Suresh Babu
- 58 Ride-sharing Apps for Urban Refugees
Easing or Exacerbating a Digital Transport Disadvantage?
Charles Martin-Shields
- 63 Placemaking as Utopia in Latin America
Displacement as a Double Condition in Times of the Pandemic
Kathrin Golda-Pongratz
- 68 Book reviews
- 71 Editorial (Deutsch)

The Êzîdî and the Permanent Life in the Refugee Camps

Hasan Sinemillioglu, Salah Khudeda and Furat Kutî

This article is about the situation and perspectives of the Êzîdî [Yazidis] in Iraq, who are currently mostly living in refugee camps in the Duhok region in Northern Iraq after the exodus from the Sinjar region in August 2014. Numerous authors have written about the Êzîdî, but how do they themselves see their own life under the conditions of the exodus? We interviewed many of them, and the responses reflect their own view. The uncertainty in their life, and the missing political security and support, hinders most of them from returning to their region of origin, which is Sinjar. The exodus seems to be a never-ending condition in the life of these people.

Die Jesiden und das Leben in Flüchtlingscamps ohne Perspektive

Wie geht es den Êzîdî aus der Sinjar Region, die verfolgt, versklavt oder ermordet und zu Hunderttausenden geflohen sind, um im kurdischen Norden des Irak Schutz zu suchen? Viel wurde über sie geschrieben; aber wie sehen sie selbst ihre Situation und wie bewerten sie ihre Zukunftsperspektiven? Wir haben viele interviewt und beschreiben ihre Lebensbedingungen aus ihrer Sicht. Die Unsicherheit in ihrem Leben, die fehlende politische Sicherheit und Unterstützung hindert sie daran, zu ihren Ursprungsorten in der Sinjar Region zurückzukehren. Der Exodus scheint ein Dauerzustand ihres Lebens zu werden.

What happened to the Êzîdî [Yazidis] people from the Sinjar region after the exodus? How is their daily life, and what do they think about their future perspectives? Does the political environment after the end of the IS occupation address the needs of the refugees in their own land – the so-called *Internally Displaced People* (IDPs)? We wanted to find answers to these questions by letting Êzîdî refugees talk and report about themselves, their situation, and their life.

We conducted numerous interviews at different points in time. The first interviews were recorded as early as September 2014. The respondents were people living in the Barwari Bala region and people living in Sharia before the camps were established. These early interviews were mostly non-structured group conversations with women, men and children.

More recently, we interviewed some 20 families in the camps of Sharia and Khanke as well in the town of Sharia and nearby villages. In most cases, we managed to speak to the (male) family heads. Two of these families had just come back from Sinjar, after leaving the camps, and had tried a new start in their region of origin.

The background

Sinjar is a district located at the border between Syria and Iraq, and belongs to the Nineveh Governorate of Iraq with Mosul as the capital. The small town of Sinjar is the administrative centre of the district, located 120 km west of Mosul and about 170 km southwest of Duhok – with regular road connections to both Mosul and Duhok.

Continuing its crusade against Iraq and after having conquered the city of Mosul, the so-called Islamic State (IS) started its attacks on the Êzîdî on 3 August 2014, causing a mass exodus.¹ As a result, the fleeing Êzîdî tried to reach the Kurdish regions in the north as a safe haven. However, soon the roads and paths to the north were cut off as the

whole of Sinjar District was surrounded by IS followers. '[...] In August 2014 alone, IS killed 3,100 Yazidis and abducted 6,800 more (Ibid: 15).' The abducted women and children were enslaved – Düzen Tekkal describes the story of one of these women in her penetrating documentary film, *Jiyan – Die vergessenen Opfer des IS* ['Jiyan – The Forgotten Victims of the IS'].²

For thousands of Êzîdî, the only way out of the Sinjar District was the route towards the border to Syria. However, this route leads through the Sinjar Mountains, which meant an escape odyssey of several days that was a deadly trip especially for the elderly and children. The long trip took the route through Northwest Syria and across the Tigris River near Pesh-Khabur [Faysh Khabur] back into the Kurdish region of Iraq (see: REACH 2014). Ferhan K. reports:

'We left Telabant [village] on the 4th of August 2014 for the Sinjar Mountains, stayed there for seven days, then fled to Kurdistan through Suhela Bridge [from Syria] and settled down in the Khanke complex in a semi-constructed house for three months.'

Waleed K. reports:

'On the 5th of August, we fled from Tel Azier to the Syrian border and from there to Fishkhabour Bridge near the Zakho border; our trip took three days. We entered Kurdistan on the 8th of August 2014. During the first three months, we stayed in a school in Summel [a small town west of Duhok city], then at the end of 2014 and after the camps had been established, we settled down in Sharia camp with many of our relatives.'

Others were able to flee by car before the roads were cut off. Saad S. is one of them:

¹ See <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2759/2020/en/>, p. 12.

² The movie was available on ARD till 9.12.2021: <https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/dokumentation-und-reportage/jiyan-die-vergessenen-opfer-des-is/rbb-fernsehen/Y3jpZDovL3JiY11vbmxpbnUuZGUvZG9rdS8yM-DiWLEyLTA5VDizOJA10-jAwX2MzNjlyYjY3LTA1NDU-tNGY1NS1iM2FkLTZlNDhkN-TY3YTk5MCM9qaXlhb0tL-WRpZS12ZXJnZXNzZW5lbi1vc-GZlci1kZXMtaXM/>

'We are from Sinone, in the north of the Sinjar Mountains. We left Sinone on the 5th of August 2014 by car and arrived the same day in Baadre. Our relatives sheltered us.'

And Sharaf B., too, found refuge at the home of relatives. He has this to say:

'I am from Khanasor sub-district in the north of the Sinjar Mountains; we left Khanasor on the 5th of August 2014 by car, and came to Sharia town and stayed in our relatives' house, and then we rented the same house until now.'

During the same time, Arabs as well as Christian Assyrians fled from Mosul city and from the Eastern part of Nineveh Governorate to Duhok Governorate, all fleeing from IS – all this in addition to approximately 200,000 refugees from Syria, who have lived in the Duhok region for many years. This sudden and large population movement was a challenge for the people and the administration of Duhok Governorate. Until then, the Governorate of Duhok had had a population of approximately 800,000 inhabitants. After the influx of refugees in the wake of the IS occupation, the population of Duhok Governorate almost doubled.

IDPs in Duhok Governorate

When, in September 2014, the co-author of this report, Hasan Sinemillioglu, entered Iraq through its border with Turkey at Habur/Ibrahim Khalil, the refugees from Sinjar already occupied all the streets and parks around the city of Zakho. The situation in the surroundings of the city of Duhok was no different. Within less than two weeks, almost 400,000 IDPs from the Sinjar region were seeking protection in Duhok Governorate.

Being the biggest city north of Nineveh Governorate, Duhok city was the main target of the *Êzîdî* fleeing the Sinjar region. They settled in schools, in many public buildings, in buildings still under construction and in public parks. The immediate response came from the inhabitants of Duhok Governorate itself; many people invited the IDPs into their homes, and especially the relatives and members of the *Êzîdî* community organised support for the accommodation of the refugees. A large majority of the people in Duhok were willing to help, offering food and water to the IDPs as well as accepting the occupation of the roads, parks and schools for sheltering the refugees.

Most of the *Êzîdî* coming from Sinjar District had lost everything and did not have the option to buy or rent a house or a flat. A number of *Êzîdî* found the support of their relatives in Duhok Governorate: there are *Êzîdî* living also in the small towns of Shekhan, Bardaresh, Baadre, Sharia and Khanke. Nevertheless, the large majority of *Êzîdî* had to settle in informal and temporary locations.³

'What will happen to us?'

Many of the IDPs were looking for a shelter everywhere in the Duhok Governorate. An example is the region of Barwari Bala, about 80 km to the northeast of Duhok. About 500 *Êzîdî* families looked for shelter in this region; many schools in the villages were occupied for shelter. The local government was not able to provide the IDPs with the



Picture 1: Child and mother in their new "home" in Dohuk, September 2014. Photo: Sinemillioglu



Picture 2: Home for a family in a building under construction in Dohuk, October 2014. Photo: Sinemillioglu

3 Due to the summer vacation, school buildings were not in use at the time of the arrival of the IDPs, allowing an unproblematic temporary accommodation in these buildings.

necessary food and other equipment. NGOs had to organise the necessary support. In Barwari Bala, the NGOs DhK and KURDS (Kurdistan Reconstruction and Development Society) is a local NGO in Duhok, which was established 1992. These two organisations have been collaborating since 2010 in the region.

necessary food and other equipment. NGOs had to organise the necessary support. In Barwari Bala, the NGOs DhK and KURDS tried to provide the IDPs with food supply.⁴ Meeting and talking to these IDPs was a not easy. One of them in Barwari Bala, the *Faqir*, who is a religious office bearer, a priest, replied to Hasan Sinemillioglu on 5 September 2014, after a while of silence:

'What will happen to us?'

This helpless question showed the extent of the catastrophe that had happened to the *Êzîdî* from Sinjar!

In Sharia,⁵ an *Êzîdî* town about 10 km to the south of Duhok city, the IDPs answered in same direction:

'We do not know, what will happen to us! We live now in school buildings, in buildings under construction, in seven villages around Sharia, where no services are existing.'

4 DhK (Dortmunder helfen in Kooperation) is a small NGO from Dortmund, Germany. KURDS (Kurdistan Reconstruction and Development Society) is a local NGO in Duhok, which was established 1992. These two organisations have been collaborating since 2010 in the region.

5 Sharia is a small town south of Duhok city with about 15,000 inhabitants. It was a small *Êzîdî* village, which was extended to a collected town during the 1980s. It belongs to Duhok Governorate.

Picture 3: The *Faqir*, right, with a group of IDPs in the school, Qumri, September 5, 2014. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



Picture 4: Food distribution in Sharia, Sept 6, 2014. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



'Our settlements are under occupation. As long as these places are under the control of Islamists, we cannot return. A special problem in the future is [that] once our settlements are freed, the collaborating Arab people in our neighbouring settlements will remain.⁶ How can we live together with these people, who attacked us together with IS? Enormous injustices were committed by these collaborating people! Under these conditions, it must be made possible for our Êzîdî people to leave the country and look for a secure life abroad.'

Sharia was one of the target destinations for the Êzîdî fleeing the Sinjar region. 60,000 Êzîdî IDPs from the Sinjar and Alqush regions fled between the 3rd and 8th of August 2014 to Sharia. Out of 60,000 IDPs, 30,000 remained in Sharia; they were later settled in Sharia and the IDP camp adjacent to the town.

Organising the IDP camps

The efforts to build camps for the IDPs started immediately after their arrival in Duhok Governorate. However, financial resources were scarce. At the time, the Kurdistan Regional Government was facing huge financial problems, mainly because of the disputes with the Iraqi Central Government but also because of the enormous military expenses of its defence against IS. The international community, the UN agencies and the international NGOs had to organise comprehensive support for the IDPs in the region. The international community is experienced in assisting the region because of their ongoing efforts since the crisis following the Kuwait war in 1991. The local NGOs have good expertise in organising help and support, including the acceptance by Duhok's local inhabitants.

Now, almost seven years after the IS occupation, support for the IDPs is more or less taken care of – but the question about the future life of the IDPs remains unanswered. At the same time, life simply continues: people try to

organise their lives with all possible self-organised activities, and shops offer the necessary goods and services in the camps. In short, the IDPs have come to terms with their life in the situation as it is.

There are more than 96,099 families (501,422 individuals) of Êzîdî IDPs distributed mainly among 22 camps. The camps are settlements of small tents with a population of up to 25,000 inhabitants.⁷ It is a limited life in all respects: about 15 square metres (average) of space in tents for up to five persons – a family is entitled to more than one tent if there are more than five family members (REACH 18: 10).

Facilities like schools, kindergartens, sports grounds, health centres and administration units for the management can be found in the camps. However, these facilities have a very limited capacity. The administrations of the camps are under Duhok Governorate, and the facilities are mostly funded by UN agencies or international NGOs, while the implementation is mostly taken care of by local NGOs.

Return to the places of origin versus waiting

We interviewed the people in different camps and in locations outside the camps. Our interviewees were mostly men, the family heads. The men still decide the important issues of the family, so the interviews concentrated mainly on the plans for the future of the families, and mainly on if they would like to return to their places of origin.

Considering the circumstances of the life in the camps, it is understandable that the refugees obviously express the wish to leave the camps and return to their places of origin. However, according to the data provided by UNHCR and IOM (IOM 2021), there is a weak tendency among the IDPs for actually returning to the Sinjar region. The IDPs considering a return to the Sinjar region

6 During the IS occupation, especially in the Sinjar region, many Moslems collaborated with the IS and joined them in attacking the Êzîdî people. This is still a strong source of conflict after the IS occupation was terminated.

7 The camps were funded and constructed by UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, IOM, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management of Turkey) (IOM 2021).



◀ **Picture 5:** The camp construction in Sharia, September 2014. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



◀ **Picture 6:** Camp in Sharia for around 4 000 Families. Photo: Sinemillioglu.

Note on the sources:

One of the sources of information was the continuous personal observations of the three authors in different camps and in different locations in the Governorate of Duhok since 2014. Salah Khudeda and Furat Kuti live in Sharia, where they have close relations with the IDPs. Salah has work connections with the Sinjar region, which he visits on a regular basis. Hasan Sinemillioglu has visited the Duhok region regularly and has connections with the IDPs and students of the Êzîdî community.

The other sources are the documents of local and international NGOs and UN organisations, especially IOM and UNHCR.

Sources

- Amnesty International (2020): <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2759/2020/en/>, accessed 20.12.2020
- DhK (Dortmunder helfen in Kooperation (2014): http://dhk-ev.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Reisebericht_Fluechtlinge_2014.pdf, accessed 20.12.2020
- IOM (2021): <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Displacement> and <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Returns> accessed 30.01.2021

are more or less those who are forced to go back. Many IDPs are employed in the security and military sector or other sectors of the Iraqi state government. If they do not return to their homes, they risk losing their employment status and their source of income. In most cases, the employees that have returned to Sinjar left their families in the camps. They expect the families to follow later on.

There are many reasons for the IDPs to postpone the return to their locations of origin. Different aspects of security play a big role. One of the most important reasons, reflecting their fear, is that their original settlements are close to Arab settlements.

Farhan K. points out that aspect. He says:

‘Telabant is a village located in south of [the] Sinjar Mountains and close to Arab villages. We really need to feel safe and everything should be guaranteed in order to leave to Sinjar, and I am

also afraid of taking the risk and to leave my current location, because nothing is guaranteed till now – I still do not feel confident.’

Saad S. too is not confident about the security at all:

‘Part of my family will stay here in Baadre; we still don’t feel confident regarding the security in the whole Sinjar District. There are still no stable administrative structures established.’

And Jamal Q. R. underlines the political insecurity:

‘I am not planning to go back to Sinjar because of its unstable political situation. I do not know what will happen in the future; I may return one day to my old place.’

As the IS was beaten and removed from Mosul and Nineveh Governorate, the retreating forces destroyed settlements and created traps with mines and IEDs.⁸ Only in

8 Improvised explosive device (IED)

Picture 7: Men and child in the front of a shop. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



Picture 8: Baking bread in a tent. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



Picture 9: Inside the Lalish Temple. Photo: Sinemillioglu.



few locations in the south of the Sinjar Mountains has the security situation improved due to the clearing of these traps and the rehabilitation of some public infrastructure. Most returnees go to the Al-Baaj districts south of Sinjar town, to the Sinjar town itself, and to nearby villages.

Still, the security situation, the political settings, and the social and financial means are all in all not encouraging enough for most of the IDPs to go back to their original locations. Therefore, the majority of the IDPs remain in the camps: in 16 IDP camps, only 29,587 people out of 169,308 – about 17% – have returned to their homes (IOM 2021).

According to a survey presented by REACH,⁹ most of the IDPs from Sinjar do not want to return to their 'Area of Origin (AoO)' (REACH 2019, p. 12). The survey results show the following figures for Sinjar:

Table 1: Reasons for not going back to the area of origin

Reason for not going back to AoO	In % *
House damaged or destroyed in AoO	33
Lack of security forces in AoO	41
No financial means to return	13
Presence of mines in AoO	42
Fear of discrimination	29

* Respondents could provide multiple reasons. Therefore, the sum exceeds 100%. Source: REACH 2019

A number of the IDPs are living in the cities and towns in Duhok Governorate. There is hardly any data on the IDPs living outside the camps. It is safe to assume that the IDPs living in these locations are less willing to return because most of them have already organised work and dwelling, especially in Duhok city and in the towns of Shekhan, Shariya, Khanke, Baadre and Sumail, as well as in the cities of Zacho and Aqre.

To understand the thoughts and decisions of the people living outside the camps a little better, we interviewed some families regarding their plans to return to their original homes. The families interviewed live in the towns of Shariya and Baadre and in the city of Duhok.

The IDPs living in the above-mentioned cities and towns have better living conditions and many of the family members have regular work places compared with the families living in the camps. The housing conditions are considerably better as well. Most of these families are not willing to go back to Sinjar because they think it is not safe and secure there, so they fear they will have more difficult living conditions there. Jeweller Ali S. A., from Dogeree, explains:

'I live in Shariya town; after ISIS attacked Sinjar, we escaped to Shariya. At the beginning, I lived for a while in my friend's house; after that, I bought my own house in Shariya, and I am living here. Now I have my jeweller shop in Shariya, and I have my own customers. Because of that, I am not planning to go back to Sinjar, as my customers are still here.'

Mr. Ali points out that he has no plans for going back to Sinjar. His family would return:

'... [If] all people return to Sinjar and Sinjar is as before, with all basic services and normal life with availability of livelihood opportunity, I may return. As of now, only those people are returning to Sinjar who do not have any income, so if I return now and open my jewellery shop there, I will lose a lot because the people in Sinjar have no means to buy gold compared with people living in Shariya town.'

Asked about the general situation of the Êzîdî and if they want to out-migrate from the country, the answers were different, although almost all of them reported to have relatives abroad.

Some persons interviewed had the tendency to emigrate and leave the country:

'My brother-in-law lives in the USA, and he already processed our papers in order to accompany them in future. To be honest, I would like to emigrate, [to] leave everything behind, and find a future for my family [abroad],' says the interviewee Farhan K.

However, not all of them would like to leave the country, as Saad S. points out:

'We have relatives in Germany and Australia, but I don't want to leave my country! [...] We have relatives living abroad, but we have never thought about emigrating to live abroad.'

Many families organised small businesses in different sectors and they are not willing to change their 'settled life conditions'. Some people are also working in the security sector in the Duhok region; for example, they have joined the Peshmerga, the Kurdish military organisation, and are not willing to return, as Sharaf B. told:

'I opened a small health clinic, and both sons are Peshmerga. And, the situation in Sinjar needs to be clear. We need security and a functioning government – then we will return back.'

One of the interviewees, Waleed K., who is living in the town of Sharia, explained the situation with the words:

'I want to stay here because I am working every day with a small company selling construction materials. In addition, my family has got used to the lifestyle here. Therefore, I am still not ready to go back to Sinjar.'

Asked for his thoughts on emigration, the interviewee replied:

'I do have relatives in Germany and my sister is in Australia, but I do not want to emigrate to any other country. We want to stay here in Iraq among our people and relatives.'

The interviewee Jamal Q. R., from Khana Soor village, organises livestock and answers:

'I live in old Regava village near Shariya town, I am taking care of my own business here in

sheep husbandry. I am not planning to go back to Sinjar because of its unstable political situation. In the absence of compensation from the Iraqi government, it is difficult to go back to Sinjar. As for now, I am not thinking to return to Sinjar, but I do not know what will happen in the future. I may return one day to my old place.'

Asked about his plans regarding migrating abroad, Mr. Jamal replied:

'I do not have a close relative abroad, but of course, all people want to go out of Iraq. However, in my case I cannot leave my wife and children alone because I am the one who takes care of them and generates income. At the same time, we cannot go all together because I cannot cover that financially.'

Future perspectives? Camps as permanent settlement and/or integration into the Kurdish settlements?

Thinking about the future of the IDPs, for the Êzîdî one option could be to integrate them into the existing Kurdish cities and villages in Duhok Governorate. In fact, parts of the camps are going to be a part of the adjacent settlements, especially if the Êzîdî community mainly inhabits the neighbouring locations. This is, for example, the case in Khanke and Sharia. These and other Êzîdî towns, such as Shekhan

9
<https://www.reachresourcecentre.info/about/>

The current situation in Khanke camp as an example

The shelters in Khanke camp started with tents on a cement floor. Each family got one tent, with an average family size of 7.5 persons. As many refugees are still not willing to return to their homes, they have now lived in Khanke camp for almost seven years. In order to improve their living conditions in the camp and to protect themselves from the heavy rain, the inhabitants built walls, approx. 0.5 m. high, in their tents. For the construction, the families used mostly cement and concrete, sometimes also clay and wood. The walls are built inside the tent since they are not allowed to make modifications to the shelters/tents.

This was the first stage of the incremental building phase started by small modifications of the tents.

Over time, many inhabitants constructed walls of up to 2 metres height inside their tents. Only the roof remained as it was. The walls allowed for some protection against heat in the summer and cold in the winter, as well as from the many fires that broke out in the camp that left many people dead or with no shelter; this was the second stage. Still, from outside, the tents looked as normal as in their original form, so that the camp management did not recognise the modifications.

In the third stage, the inhabitants included a bathroom and a kitchen in the tent by building a fence around the tent and making the bath and the kitchen part of the house. The tents now resemble normal low-income houses. Most people also used food bags that were sewn together to construct a fence around their tent-homes.



First Stage



Second Stage



Third Stage

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and Baadre, are still the destination of the IDPs for starting a new settlement instead of returning to the Sinjar region.

The question is simply, what is going to happen to the camps in the near future? Are these temporary shelters slowly developing into permanent settlements? It can certainly be expected that in the short run the camps will continue to exist. By 2025, in not more than four years from now, the camps will have existed for more than ten years – a new generation will then have grown up under the conditions of the living environment in the camps: poor housing and services, especially limited opportunities for

education, no regular work and so on. However, if there is no other choice, the camps will continue to serve as homes for a large number of people. The question will be how the camps and their inhabitants can be connected and integrated in the social and spatial structure of Duhok Governorate.

Reconstruction and resettlement

Is it a realistic idea that the *Êzîdî* IDPs might return to their places/areas of origin and simply continue their lives that they had to leave behind?



Figure 10: Map of *Êzîdî* – Northern Iraq. "Refugee and Camps in KRG and Nineveh Governorate". Source: REACH 2020.

Beyond the security issue, there are obviously no concepts for the future development of the region and/or for the repatriation of the Êzîdî camp inhabitants for either re-settling outside the camps or repatriation to the Sinjar region, as our observations and interactions with the target group show. This is probably one of the major reasons why the people have no confidence in returning to, and being active in the shaping a new life-environment in, the region.

The Iraqi Central Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil are the responsible actors for such a programme. However, both parties are engaged in a dispute over the Sinjar region. The KRG would like to add the district to the KRG, whereas the central government is not willing to accept a status change of the Sinjar region. As long as this dispute is not solved, new concepts cannot be developed to start a new life for the IDPs in their places of origin.

The IDPs do not feel secure and do not have confidence in the political decision-making, neither of the central government nor the KRG; they feel they are being left alone. In addition, this uncertainty intensifies the psychological feelings of no future: they have been waiting for almost seven years for future perspectives and they have the feeling that nothing is happening.

Two examples show that the governmental institutions are not really supporting the returnees:

Jalal K. R. is a construction worker and the head of a family with six members from Tel-Azer village. He was a returnee to his village. After a while, he returned to the camp:

'I live now again in Chameshko camp. I returned to Tel-Azer village at the beginning of February 2021, with a group of relatives, because at that time there was a rumour that any family returning back would get compensation from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement. We stayed until the end of April and we did not get any support there, and also I did not find a job to support my family. Therefore, I decided to return to the camp. I am a construction worker and depend on daily income to support my family – in the camps, we have at least the support by NGOs.'

Barakat H. S. is a mechanic and the head of a family of eight persons from Sinjar city. He, too, was a returnee. After a while, he turned back to the camp:

'I decided to go back to Sinjar when there was a unified decision from all Sinjar people¹⁰ and also both the KRG and Iraqi government to give services and work opportunities to returnees. I left Sinjar city on the 4th of August 2014, and settled down in non-formal camps till 2018; then I moved to the formal camp in Khanke at the end of 2018. I decided to go back to Sinjar city, Al-Shuhada neighbourhood, at the beginning of 2020. I stayed there for four months [and] then decided to return back to Khanke camp because of the lack of services and work opportunities, and also [because] most of our neighbours were still in KRG. Therefore we decided to return back.'

About his work, he explained that he was not able to establish his work in Sinjar:

'I am a mechanic and have a small shop in the Khanke complex. I earn my daily income from this small shop. I tried to open my small mechanic shop in Sinjar, but because I lost most of my assets in 2014 and also lack business in Sinjar, it was better for my family to come back to KRG.'

Many IDPs would like to return and start a new life in their places of origin. Work and job opportunities are an important aspect for returnees. As both Mr. Barakat H. S. and Mr. Jalal K. R. point out, the IDPs need compensation for their lost properties in order to start new businesses, construct their houses, and have enough means for daily food and other needs until their businesses delivers income.

'I need to have compensation or grants to open my business in Sinjar and return back. Also, having stable daily earning besides stable safety and security in Sinjar area will give me more confident to go back,' says Mr. Barakat.

Mr. Jalal also points out:

'Having services, getting job opportunities and a compensation from the Iraqi government will be a good motivation for us to return.'

Beyond that, the destruction of the Êzîdî villages in the 1980s is one of the major factors why people cannot return to the villages and start a farming life. There are simply no more traditional villages. This fact demonstrates how necessary it is to develop concepts for the future of the whole of the Sinjar region.

A further challenge

A further challenge for the Êzîdî community is its traditional social structure. The community is a closed society; marriages from outside are strictly forbidden. An outsider cannot be integrated into the Êzîdî community: being born Êzîdî is the only way to become Êzîdî. And vice versa: no Êzîdî person is allowed to leave the community, e.g., by marrying a non-Êzîdî – in that case, this person loses all family ties and social contacts in the community. As long as the Êzîdî community was living in closed spatial units, i.e., in small villages, the tradition was able to sustain itself.

However, the Êzîdî society is strongly faced with factors making this closeness more and more difficult. School and higher education, open spaces like cities and towns, modern communication media like television, radio, widely available internet services and activities, extended means of travel – all that causes a bundle of challenges for the traditional life-world and young generations of the Êzîdî community.

There are so many questions facing the Êzîdî community today that nobody can answer – unless the community itself searches for novel solutions.

10 The people of the Êzîdî community in general, and particularly their religious and community leaders, want that the IDPs to return back to their home because they are of opinion that the Êzîdî community can only survive if they return to Sinjar.



Hasan Sinemillioğlu

PhD in spatial planning, since 2009 he has been the Programme Coordinator of the "Planning Education in Iraq (PLIQ)" project, a collaboration between TU Dortmund University and University Dohuk, Iraq. He is the Chairman of the NGO "Dortmunder helfen in Kooperation" (DhK) e.V. <hasan.sinemillioğlu@tu-dortmund.de>



Furat Kutî

B.Sc. in Urban and Regional Planning; M.Sc. SPRING - Regional Development Planning and Management from Germany and Tanzania. <furatkutî@outlook.com>



Salah H. Khadeeda

M.Sc. in Civil Engineering, National Taiwan University. Currently assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Spatial Planning at Duhok University. He is also the coordinator of Barzani Charity Foundation. <salah.khadeeda@uod.ac>

Editorial (Deutsch)

Städte spielen im Kontext von Flucht und Vertreibung eine Schlüsselrolle. Nur etwa ein Drittel der derzeit weltweit mehr als 20 Millionen Geflüchteten, die ihr Herkunftsland verlassen mussten, lebt in Lagern; die große Mehrheit wohnt in städtischen oder peri-urbanen Gebieten - hauptsächlich in Ländern des globalen Südens. Bei den Binnenvertriebenen ist dieser Anteil sogar noch größer. Aufgrund des weltweit zu beobachtenden Trends zu langanhaltenden Vertreibungssituationen gewinnen Städte somit auch als Integrationsräume eine immer größere Bedeutung. Auch globale Politikagenden erkennen dies an. So betont die Neue Urbane Agenda der VN-Städtekonferenz Habitat III von 2016 die Verantwortung von Städten, sich für die Rechte von Geflüchteten und Migrant*innen einzusetzen. Der Globale Flüchtlingspakt der Vereinten Nationen von 2018 ruft dazu auf, Geflüchtete in Zukunft nicht mehr in Lagern unterzubringen.

Obwohl die herausragende Rolle von Städten und Ballungsräumen für Schutzsuchende seit einiger Zeit hervorgehoben wird, bleiben viele Fragen offen. Diesen widmet sich die vorliegende Trialog-Ausgabe. So wird beispielsweise untersucht, inwieweit Politiken auf globaler, nationaler und lokaler Ebene die urbane Dimension von Flucht und Vertreibung angemessen berücksichtigen und wie sie sich aufeinander auswirken. Außerdem stehen Strategien und Herausforderungen lokaler urbaner Akteure im Fokus des Themenheftes. Dabei wird auch untersucht, wie Klima- und Umweltveränderungen, zwischen- und innerstaatliche Konflikte oder auch die Digitalisierung Fluchtentscheidungen und die Erfahrungen geflüchteter Menschen in urbanen Räumen beeinflussen.

Der Schwerpunkt dieser Ausgabe liegt auf Städten – einschließlich Flüchtlingscamps - im globalen Süden. Dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass wir die Relevanz des Themas im globalen Norden nicht in den Blick nehmen. Immerhin erscheint TRIALOG in Deutschland, wo der innenpolitische Diskurs in den letzten Jahren stark durch den massiven Flüchtlingszustrom 2015 geprägt war. Daher beschäftigen sich drei Beiträge in dieser Ausgabe auch mit Fallbeispielen aus Deutschland.

Im ersten Artikel dieser Ausgabe untersucht **Eva Dick** am Fallbeispiel der Kalobeyi-Siedlung im Norden Kenias die Rolle einflussreicher Akteure für die Umsetzung von lokaler Integration als ‚neuen‘ fluchtpolitischen Ansatz. Sicherheitsinteressen und der Mangel an humanitären Mitteln waren zentrale Treiber auf Seiten der nationalen Regierung und im regionalen Kontext. Für die lokale Regierung ging es darum, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung voranzutreiben.

Im Gegensatz zu gängigen alarmistischen Szenarien von zig Millionen „Klimaflüchtlings“, die schon bald in Richtung Europa ziehen könnten, kommt **Benjamin Schraven** in seinem Überblick über die Forschung zum Klima-Migrations-Nexus zum Schluss, dass die Wechselwirkungen von Ökologie auf menschliche Mobilität sehr komplex sind und dass der Klimawandel wahrscheinlich in erster Linie zu mehr innerstaatlicher und intraregionaler (Zwangs-)Migration im globalen Süden führen wird. Städten kommt in diesem Zusammenhang sowohl als politischen Akteuren aber auch als Mobilitätsschauplätzen und Hotspots des Klimawandels eine ganz besondere Rolle zu.

Der dritte Artikel dieser Ausgabe besteht aus drei Interviews mit lokalen Akteuren aus unterschiedlichen Teilen der Welt: **Hamidul Hoque Chowdhury**, der gewählte Bezirkschef von Cox's Bazar in Bangladesch, **Ulrich Sierau**, ehemaliger Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Dortmund in Deutschland, und **Patrick Lokewan Nabwel**, Experte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) der im kenianischen Kakuma arbeitet. Gemeinsam tauschen sie Erfahrungen aus erster Hand über kurz- und langfristige Integrationsherausforderungen aus.

Dem folgt ein Beitrag von **Einhart Schmidt-Kallert**, der die unglaubliche Geschichte der Hausbesetzer*innen des Hauses in der Oberen Maschstraße 10 in der Göttinger Innenstadt erzählt. Was als Nothilfeprojekt zur Unterstützung von Geflüchteten begann, entwickelte sich nach und nach zu einem Wohnprojekt, das einige Besonderheiten aufweist: es ist autonom, generationenübergreifend und multikulturell.

Der Artikel von **Janina Stürmer** unterstreicht, wie afrikanische Städte unterschiedliche Formen der Städtediplomatie betreiben, etwa indem sie ein Mitspracherecht in internationalen migrationspolitischen Foren einfordern. Die Autorin kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die afrikanische Städtediplomatie nicht nur symbolische, sondern auch pragmatische und rechtsstiftende Zwecke verfolgt.

Hasan Sinemillioglu, Furat Kutli und Salah Hhadeeda schildern in ihrem Beitrag die Situation und Perspektiven der Jesiden im Irak, die seit ihrer Vertreibung aus der Region Sindschar im August 2014 vor allem in Flüchtlingslagern in der Region Duhok im Nordirak leben. Der Artikel stützt sich hauptsächlich auf die Stimmen der Jesiden selbst und schließt mit einem eher pessimistischen Blick auf die Zukunft der jesidischen Gemeinschaft im Nordirak.

Salam Alhaj untersucht Unterschiede im Zugang zu Arbeit und Bildung bei syrischen Geflüchteten im jordanischen Lager Zaatari und Jordaniens Hauptstadt Amman und vergleicht diese beiden Aufenthalts- und Integrationskontexte miteinander. Die Autorin analysiert dabei vor allem die Unterschiede in Bezug auf Teilnahme am (formellen) Erwerbsleben.

Der Artikel von **Ayham Dalal und Philipp Misselwitz** setzt sich mit der Rolle von Unterkünften und, wie Geflüchtete sie in ihrem Alltag aneignen, auseinander. Dafür sammelten und analysierten die Autoren architektonische und ethnographische Daten aus den beiden Lagern Zaatari in Jordanien und Tempohomes in der deutschen Hauptstadt Berlin. Die Autoren kommen zu dem Schluss, dass alle Unterkünfte, egal wie gut sie architektonisch gestaltet sind, von ihren Bewohnern an die eigenen Bedürfnisse angepasst werden.

Suresh Babu beleuchtet in seinem Beitrag die Vulnerabilität von Migrant*innen, insbesondere aufgrund der COVID-19-Pandemie. Seine Studie basiert auf Interviews mit Wanderarbeiter*innen, die im südindischen Chennai arbeiten und leben. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die zentralen Herausforderungen der Wanderarbeiter*innen fehlende soziale Sicherheit und ein unzureichender Zugang zur Grundversorgung sind, was durch die Auswirkungen der Pandemie noch weiter verschärft wurde.

Der Artikel von **Charles Martin-Shields** dreht sich um die Benachteiligung im Bereich des urbanen Verkehrs, der viele Geflüchtete ausgesetzt sind. Anhand von Forschungsergebnissen aus Kuala Lumpur bewertet der Artikel das Potenzial von Konzepten wie digital organisierten Mitfahrgelegenheiten, um den Alltag von Geflüchteten beim Zugang zu Verkehrsmitteln zu erleichtern

Der Essay von **Kathrin Golda-Pongratz** stützt sich auf langjährige Recherchen zu informellen bzw. selbsterrichteten Quartieren am Stadtrand der peruanischen Hauptstadt Lima mit einem besonderen Fokus auf die Auswirkungen der COVID-19-Pandemie. Die Autorin betont, dass die Pandemie nicht nur zu einer wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch einer mobilitätsbezogenen Belastung für viele der Bewohner*innen geworden ist, die ihre Häuser am Stadtrand Limas zum Teil bereits vor Jahrzehnten gebaut hatten, während der Pandemie aber gezwungen waren, in ihre ländlichen Herkunftsorte zurückzukehren.

Eva Dick, Einhart Schmidt-Kallert und Benjamin Schraven (verantwortliche Herausgeber*innen dieses Themenheftes)

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Franziska Laue (Mitglieder und Konferenzkontakt / members and conference liaison) Breitscheidstr. 37, 70176 Stuttgart E-Mail: members@trialog-journal.de

Dorcas Nthoki Nyamai (Koordination Herausgeberschaft / Coordinating editor) TU Dortmund - August-Schmidt-Straße 6, 44227 Dortmund E-mail: editor@trialog-journal.de

Beirat / Advisory committee:

Paola Alfaro d'Alençon <paola.alfarodalencon@tu-berlin.de>

Hassan Ghaemi <hassan.ghaemi@ghaemi-architekten.de>

Kathrin Golda-Pongratz <kathrin@pongratz.org>

Peter Gotsch <info@peter-gotsch.de>

Astrid Ley <astrid.ley@si.uni-stuttgart.de>

Philipp Misselwitz <misselwitz@tu-berlin.de>

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Wolfgang Scholz <wolfgang.scholz@tu-dortmund.de>

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Florian Steinberg <florian_steinberg@yahoo.de>

Antje Wemhöner <A.Wemhoener@gmx.de>

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Kosta Mathey <kosta.mathey@gmail.com>

Jürgen Oestereich <J_Oestereich@gmx.de>

Klaus Teschner <teschner@habitants.de>

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